

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 13 February 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN

(India)

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA Mr. E. MOREIRA HOSANNAH Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
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United States of America:

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Special Representative of the  
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Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the 364th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): The purpose of my intervention today is to scrutinize how the draft treaty before us (ENDC/192/Rev.1, 193/Rev.1) can be harmonized with agreements in regard to other partial disarmament measures. Such an examination will prove the need to undertake some minor adjustments to the present text. Amendments to that effect are presented in document ENDC/216, supplementary to the amendments submitted by my delegation in document ENDC/215.
3. For many years now the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have been clamouring for concrete results not only in the field of non-proliferation but also in regard to other steps to halt the nuclear arms race. Two additional measures have been foremost in the thinking of the Swedish delegation, which early included them in a so-called "package": a comprehensive test ban, and a cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes. Treaties to cover those two measures -- and any other measure to follow -- must be combined in a logical and systematic fashion with the non-proliferation treaty now under negotiation and with the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the outer space treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222(XXI)), and treaties on nuclear-free zones already established.
4. While we are at work on one of the treaty texts, as we are at present, we must consciously seek, as I stated last Thursday (ENDC/PV.363, para.6), to establish and at least facilitate such a systematic coherence. It is imperative that we should not, by less careful wording of one text, erect barriers to completing in a logical fashion the whole sequence. The legal language must be such that we should not have to amend one treaty in order to conclude the next -- unless we achieve a major breakthrough, say, about total nuclear disarmament, which would obviously supersede all earlier agreements.
5. Such a dovetailing of the non-proliferation treaty with a treaty on cutting off further production of fissile material for weapons would, as far as substance goes, be the most easily achieved. The great amount of work that has gone into establishing international control machinery for the purposes of non-proliferation would also directly benefit a cut-off treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system could be made immediately applicable to nuclear facilities which shut down their military production lines. From the point of view of treaty language,

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

however, some difficulties do arise. It would be interesting to know whether the legal experts in the nuclear-weapon countries have foreseen any procedure for amendments or whether they believe that some form of additional protocol might suffice for the purpose.

6. It is, of course, of considerable interest to non-nuclear-weapon States that that treaty also should be an international one, inviting us all to be signatories and thus partake in the responsibility for the observance of the treaty obligations. If a cut-off agreement is to be directly combined with the non-proliferation treaty, amendments to several of its present articles would be necessary, encompassing all States and not only non-nuclear-weapon ones under its prohibitions. Thus the treaty would be brought much closer to what has for a long time been suggested by non-nuclear-weapon States: that is, making controls applicable to all nuclear activities everywhere and to all transfers.

7. My intervention today is aimed at further clarifying the pattern of a complete triptych of treaties. Our suggested changes in the preamble and in article V would serve to keep open the option to conclude more specifically a comprehensive test ban treaty and a special agreement on the utilization of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes without having to amend the treaty which is at present the subject of our negotiations.

8. For that purpose we propose that in the second and third lines of the seventh preambular paragraph the words "by nuclear-weapon States" be deleted. They are redundant, as it suffices to mention in general terms technological by-products which may be derived from development work. We must be very careful that we do not in this text indirectly give even a semblance of a blessing to the carrying out of unending explosion activities at the discretion of individual nations.

9. Further, in article V the references made in the draft treaty text to "non-nuclear-weapon" States should be deleted in the third and sixth lines, as the benefits in question should be permitted to be made available to all States. Finally, in the same article we most strongly recommend deletion of the reference to the possibility of making arrangements for the obtaining of benefits from nuclear explosions "on a bilateral basis". In order to improve the language of the article, we have also deleted as superfluous the words "so desiring" and "or agreements" in the second sentence, these latter changes being of a formal nature only and consequential to the one I have just mentioned. Our wording of the article would therefore be in accordance with the text rendered in document ENDC/216, which is now before the Committee.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

10. Our reasons for suggesting these changes, which do not detract anything in substance from the present treaty text, are fundamentally very important. We sincerely want to warn against anything in the present treaty being construed in such a way that it may impede the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Such a treaty must have as its scope a prohibition of all nuclear explosions in all States. Thereafter an exception should be made, but only one, and an explicit exception, in order to cope with the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions which might be authorized by an international body pursuant to a special agreement.

11. The close similarity, not to say identical character, of nuclear explosive devices, whether intended for military or civilian purposes, has so often been established in this Committee, not least by the representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers, that it hardly calls for further elaboration today. We certainly have to take into account what the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, said at our meeting on 25 January, that it is an --

"... inescapable fact that the nuclear technology involved in producing nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from that involved in producing nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.359, para.22)

Obviously, that fact creates a deep dilemma for us in our treaty-making. The intention on the part of all those States which have clamoured for a test ban has always been that testing should stop for all States and that further development of nuclear weapons should be forgone. This "qualitative" aspect of the cessation of the arms race was expressed in a concise fashion by the representative of the Soviet Union when on 1 February he entered a plea for urgent consideration of the test ban issue:

"In our opinion, after the solution of the non-proliferation problem the next important problem to be dealt with is the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. To supplement the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in three environments by banning also underground nuclear tests would erect an important barrier to the replenishment of nuclear arsenals with more sophisticated types of weapons. The cessation of tests in all environments would thus be an important step on the way, which is being paved by the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to the cessation of the nuclear arms race." (ENDC/PV.361, para.11)

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

12. However, if the world is not to sacrifice the opportunities for using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, somebody must be allowed to conduct them. These technological realities must lead us to support the idea that the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions should be entrusted to the nuclear-weapon States, which already have developed nuclear devices and manufactured them in great numbers.

However, that fact, which history has indelibly established, does entail a discrimination. Worse still, it is probably unavoidable that, when that activity is reserved for the nuclear-weapon States in the interests of non-proliferation, it will provide them with a military "spin-off", a result which is clearly contrary to the wishes for nuclear disarmament upheld by all States. Therefore it seems to be a minimum requirement, in order to redress the balance as fairly as possible, that the international licensing machinery envisaged for the implementation of the explosion services in non-nuclear-weapon States should apply also to such services in nuclear-weapon States and to development testing, if any is warranted.

13. There is a moral element involved in the demand that States entrusted with a monopoly in this field should consent to having their activities properly incorporated into an international framework established by the many States signatories to the treaty. No effort should be spared to prevent the possibility of suspicion arising that an explosion for peaceful purposes might, even in a single instance, be tantamount to a nuclear weapon test, which is to be formally prohibited in the test ban treaty.

14. For the present no decision is, of course, called for. The only action needed during this period -- and I urge it as a crucial one -- is to rid the present draft treaty of some "impure" elements.

15. The whole matter of peaceful explosions, in the perspective of the future, is one of great concern to all those who are interested in closing rather than widening the technology gap, and making it less easy for the advanced nations to gain commercial and economic advantages over the weaker ones. The Swedish Government has duly recognized that. At the current United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in New Delhi the Swedish Minister of Commerce stated in his speech on 6 February that one aspect of the "technological gap" referred to --

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

"... the peaceful use of atomic energy -- both peaceful nuclear explosions, the free flow of scientific and technical information and the so-called 'spin-off' from a national nuclear-weapons programme. We believe that in a not very distant future nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes may well come to offer great economic advantages in certain development efforts such as very large civil engineering projects and the exploitation of otherwise inaccessible oil, ore and gas resources. In the discussions concerning disarmament at the United Nations and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, we have become convinced that countries without nuclear weapons should be able to exploit such possibilities through a non-discriminatory international procedure without danger of nuclear proliferation."

16. The vast majority of delegations have obviously recognized that this matter of peaceful explosions must be covered by a separate international agreement. I noticed a reference to that opinion in the statement in which the representative of the Soviet Union introduced the revised treaty text (ENDC/PV.357, para.25).

17. With regard to the reference to bilateral arrangements, which is found in the last sentence of the present wording of article V, I fully associate myself with the representative of Canada, who said in his statement on 23 January that it raised --

"... the question of whether explosive services arranged bilaterally will be subject to the same criteria or controls as international arrangements. Might not the present language, which does not indicate any element of international supervision over bilateral arrangements, create apprehensions of possible clandestine nuclear co-operation for military purposes between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States under the guise of bilateral explosive services?"

(ENDC/PV.358, para.62).

That is an unnecessary ambiguity in the present text which can best be removed by deleting the whole reference to any possibility of bilateral arrangements in this context.

18. I reiterate that our purpose as regards the changes proposed, which do not touch upon the substance of the present treaty, either its preambular paragraph or its article V, should be quite clear: to leave the way open for the treatment of this issue in a comprehensive test ban treaty and to enhance further its international element by a separate agreement on the utilization of explosive devices for peaceful purposes.



(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

19. I have so far dealt with the congruence needed between the non-proliferation treaty and the prospective test ban treaty mainly from the point of view of facilitating a constructive solution of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions, which is truly a vexed one. But, of course, the whole issue of the speedy conclusion of a test ban treaty is at stake. I would recall to all representatives that the General Assembly has specifically charged this Committee --

"... to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty" -- and I emphasize "elaboration of a treaty" -- "banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-third session". (Resolution 2343 (XXII); ENDC/210)

20. We must therefore consider what the desirability for symmetry between the present treaty text and that of the Moscow Treaty requires. It seems mandatory to introduce into this treaty text, in which the non-nuclear-weapon States are asked to forswear for ever their right not only to nuclear weapons but also to their testing, a reminder of the solemn pledge contained in the preamble to the partial test ban Treaty. In the document submitted last week (ENDC/215) the Swedish delegation formulated to that end an amendment to the preamble. We sincerely hope that that will be accepted by all delegations without any objections.

21. Objections would without doubt raise apprehensions that the super-Powers may not sincerely want a comprehensive test ban but that they tacitly take for granted that they will be allowed to continue underground testing for ever. Soon five years will have elapsed since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty and since it was solemnly declared that all tests should cease for all time; but this does not seem to be taken very seriously. Underground testing continues at a seemingly increased rate. On 29 June last year I said in this Committee:

"... testing is continuing at an ever-accelerating tempo. According to figures I have available, nuclear explosions in the world numbered 36 in 1964 ... 40 in 1965 and 60 in 1966". (ENDC/PV.309, para.13)

Today I can safely state that 1967 showed hardly any improvement. According to the notes we keep in the delegation, there were forty-seven tests conducted, among them five in the atmosphere. Several unpublished shots have to be added to that figure, as to those previously mentioned.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

22. The tendency of increasing explosion yields also remains unchanged. There have been repeated reports that underground tests have led to leakages of radioactivity outside the territorial borders of testing nations, thus in effect causing infringements of the Moscow Treaty. Although these incidents could scarcely have been intentional, they may eventually lead to a weakened respect for the Moscow Treaty and even endanger its very existence. During this year, which has but begun, at least five shots have already occurred. According to information quoted in the Press, vast testing programmes are to be launched, including several shots that will be more powerful than any hitherto undertaken underground. It is as if the responsible authorities were unaware that testing nuclear weapons is an activity condemned by an overwhelming majority of United Nations Member States.

23. What I have just described amounts to a very sombre picture, especially as some of the test series scheduled for the near future seem to be connected with a development and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles which represents a take-off into a new and steeply-escalating phase of the arms race. Against this background it becomes evident that we must regard a comprehensive test ban as a key measure for putting the brake on nuclear arms competition. From all points of view a test ban would be indicated as the issue most immediately to be considered according to the commitments made in draft article VI of the present treaty text.

24. That brings me to my final point: namely our concern for the time-table and agenda of our continued work in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I take it for granted that we should complete the deliberations on the draft treaty at present before us on the deadline set by the United Nations General Assembly, that is, 15 March. Allowing some weeks for the study of our report by other delegations, the Assembly might be expected to reconvene, say, after Easter. Before we leave Geneva we should agree on a firm date for our renewed meetings, permitting us perhaps some two weeks of relaxation after the General Assembly. Before we leave Geneva in March we should also agree on at least some fixed points on our agenda, with the understanding that we have to deal in due turn with all the issues mandated to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the United Nations, and perhaps with some others emanating from our own circle of delegations.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

25. Without doubt the test ban is the next one on the United Nations priority list. On that issue we have also accumulated a vast fund of preparatory work during earlier deliberations. If you look back particularly to what I had occasion to expound on 17 August 1967 (ENDC/PV.323) in relation to a test ban treaty and to what Mr. Burns has repeatedly referred to, and in the most ample and detailed form in his statement on 12 September 1967 (ENDC/PV.329), concerning permissions for nuclear explosive activities for peaceful purposes, I think you will find that we already possess the outlines for drafts of the two important instruments of international legislation in this field. During the summer we would be justified in expecting very considerable strides forward, perhaps even celebrating a new agreement.

26. There are a few more arguments, derived from the foreseeable time schedule in regard to the processing of the non-proliferation agreement, which speak in favour of a certain optimism. My colleagues will recall that the Swedish delegation originally asked for simultaneous results, or at least simultaneous negotiations, in the three fields of non-proliferation, a comprehensive test ban, and a cut-off. We ought as a minimum to be able to judge the prospects for the other two agreements when asked to conclude the first one.

27. Time seems to be on our side. As the signing and ratifying of the non-proliferation treaty, as well as the negotiating of safeguards agreements to implement its article III, will necessarily take a certain time, the willingness of the nuclear-weapon Powers to embark on serious negotiations on further disarmament measures in the nuclear field will during that interval be rather effectively tested. That willingness ought in fact to be demonstrated immediately, so that hesitating countries should not delay their acceptance of the non-proliferation treaty until a time when they have encountered more encouraging evidence of a brightening future than at present. That is one of the motives which have prompted the Swedish delegation here and in the United Nations so actively to probe the possibilities of a dynamic continuation of negotiations on further measures which would spell effective steps towards nuclear disarmament.

28. Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): I wish simply to offer some clarifications with regard to document ENDC/201/Rev.2, which we have submitted today. This document embodies Brazilian amendments to the revised draft treaty introduced by the representatives of the United States and the USSR (ENDC/192/Rev.1, 193/Rev.1). Most

(Mr. de Araujo Castro, Brazil)

of the amendments are merely consequential to the new wording of the draft treaty. On several occasions, and most specifically at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.363), we have adduced arguments which in our opinion would justify the adoption of those amendments by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; and we do not wish to protract our proceedings by enlarging now on the considerations we have already advanced. We wish only to stress that those amendments are submitted with the double purpose of contributing to the effectiveness and consistency of the draft non-proliferation treaty and of safeguarding what we consider to be the fundamental interests of Brazil. We reserve the right to offer further comments on the text of the draft treaty and to introduce a specific amendment to the wording of article III or amendments to other points to which the new text may give rise.

29. In our new document no reference is made to the previous amendments we submitted to paragraphs 2 and 3 of article V of the former draft treaty (ENDC/192, 193), as we feel that the points raised therein have been taken into consideration in the new draft. The present amendments refer to the new revised draft treaty. However, I wonder whether the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should not receive adequate clarification from our co-Chairmen on a point of procedure which may prove quite relevant and may have important implications for the later stage of our proceedings.

30. At our meeting of 6 February the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, maintained that all amendments submitted prior to 18 January, when the new revised treaty was introduced, should be considered null and void inasmuch as they related to a text which no longer existed (ENDC/PV.362, paras. 50, 51). It is not our purpose to enter into a detailed examination of all the procedural points involved; and perhaps we are not correctly interpreting Mr. Roshchin's meaning. However, I think it is essential that this matter be clarified once and for all by our co-Chairmen. As a matter of fact, the whole question is not at all clear in my mind. Are we to conclude from Mr. Roshchin's statement that all extant amendments will have to be reintroduced every time the United States and the Soviet Union introduce a new version of the revised draft, even if the revision embodies only minor drafting changes? We raise this point with all due respect, for we sincerely hope that the present text will undergo several revisions in the course of our negotiations before reaching its final shape.

31. In that regard we should like to mention that the revised draft treaty was presented not as an entirely new document but only as a revision of documents ENDC/192 and ENDC/193. Will the amendments already submitted be considered each time the draft treaty undergoes any change? Let us suppose, for instance, that the co-Chairmen agreed to accept Mrs. Myrdal's suggestion to the effect that the paragraph on a test ban be added to the preamble of the treaty, and that the co-Chairmen incorporated that in the text of an eventual second or third revision of the draft treaty. Would that necessitate the reintroduction of all amendments or, as may well be the case, would that necessity arise only in the case of major changes? Furthermore, what criteria will be used to determine whether a change will be considered a major or a minor change? It is imperative that some definite criteria be established. At any rate our own contention is that the members of the Committee should know where they stand on this matter.

32. I wish to submit that point for your consideration, Mr. Chairman, and for the consideration of the co-Chairmen of the Conference, who will undoubtedly be guided in their recommendation by the practice generally followed on similar occasions by other organs of the United Nations and who may, as in many previous cases, wish to consult the members of the Committee. I am not pressing for a ruling at this meeting. I wished only to raise the point in order to obtain clarification at the earliest possible opportunity. I know how tedious points of procedure are; but, unfortunately, no committee can carry on its work without a clear and pre-established procedure.

33. The CHAIRMAN (India): I have no doubt that the co-Chairmen will give some thought to the point raised by the representative of Brazil.

34. Mr. ZELLEKE (Ethiopia): Before proceeding with my prepared statement, I should like to say that we have listened attentively to the very interesting statements made today and, if need be, we shall come back to them at a later stage.

35. We are in the happy situation of being able to welcome the revised identical draft treaties submitted to us by the United States (ENDC/192/Rev.1) and the Soviet Union (ENDC/193/Rev.1) at our opening meeting on 18 January (ENDC/PV.357). In our opinion, the presentation of the revised draft marks another step forward to the final objective in our long and arduous negotiations, in this Committee and outside it, on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are happy to note that the combined efforts of all the members of this Committee, as well as those of parties outside this Committee whose presence has always been strongly felt, should finally lead to the stage of great optimism in which we find ourselves at present.

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

36. Though it is true that all members of this Committee have spared no effort in good faith to bring about success in our common task, it must be admitted in the final analysis that much of the burden of the negotiations can be attributed to the two co-Chairmen of our Committee, whose silent but intensive activities behind the scenes have been subject to certain criticism and have worried many of us. As we come finally to the present stage of negotiations as a result of the presentation of the revised draft, we should like to join others in extending our congratulations to the co-Chairmen, the authors of the identical draft treaties that are now before us.

37. It seems to us that there are as many ways of looking at this treaty as there are member nations in this Committee, depending upon the political circumstances and the economic and technological stages in which each of our nations finds itself. For many of us, including my own country, Ethiopia, the question of producing nuclear weapons and hence proliferating them does not arise -- at any rate not in any foreseeable future -- and for very obvious reasons. The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons (A/6858), which the Secretariat was good enough to distribute to us, is very revealing in this respect. Considering the degree of technological advancement required and the accompanying cost that would be incurred in order to acquire a minimum of meaningful nuclear force, it becomes a question in the realm of impossibility for many.

38. However, that does not make it any easier for those nations to make a decision on a treaty in which there is no sufficient guarantee of a continuous endeavour to rid the world of the dreadful devastation of nuclear weapons and hence enhance their national security, as it is difficult to resist the temptation not to do what may appear to be impossible in the absence of a treaty and with the resulting multiplication of nuclear Powers.

39. What is at stake here and now is not a choice between having a treaty and not having a treaty. Indeed, that choice has already been made by the world community, when it approved resolution 1665 (XVI) at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly in 1961. Nor is it a confrontation between the nuclear "haves" and "have nots". What is at stake now, and what we are entrusted by the rest of the world to resolve, is how best we can reconcile and synthesize our divergent views and the interests of each and every one of us with the wider and larger interest of world

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

peace and security. In that regard we need no convincing that no treaty of a multilateral nature can be fully satisfactory to any of its parties, and that is all the more true in the case of a non-proliferation treaty which carries in its very concept a certain discriminatory appearance. Nevertheless we are certain that our diverse interests are not mutually exclusive. They are, on the contrary, dependent one upon the other. A treaty which fails to realize that fact may be poorly founded, for a treaty will be judged not by what it aims to do but by what it will be able to accomplish.

40. In offering our views on this revised draft treaty before us today, we should like to take as our point of departure what has already been said by the leader of the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Myrdal, at our meeting on 8 February: that we are here still at a stage of negotiation and that the final position of our Governments with regard to the treaty belongs to a later stage (ENDC/PV.363, para.3). It is in that spirit that the Ethiopian delegation would now like to express views and raise queries on the different provisions of the draft treaty.

41. There is no denial that the new draft text of the treaty is a marked improvement on the previous text, both in form and in substance. For one thing it has become longer and more complete. In addition to the realization of article III, which has kept this Committee in suspense for a long time, it carries a few important additional articles. Equally undeniable is the fact that the new draft has drawn on the numerous suggestions and amendments submitted since last August and has, as a result, enriched some of its provisions. While we welcome these changes for the better in the new draft, we cannot pretend that the new text is in need of no improvement. Indeed, we find that this draft is amenable to certain changes and gives rise to questions of clarification which arise not so much from what it says as from what it leaves unsaid.

42. We are happy to see that the co-Chairmen have finally found a way of drafting article III. We are not unaware of the amount of labour, determination and spirit of compromise that were needed to realize the present draft of article III, which can be described as somewhat fragile. The appearance of this article has already given rise to talk of a cautious and inconclusive nature in the corridors outside this Committee. Also here in the Committee some pertinent questions have already been asked by some delegations. The Ethiopian delegation's view coincides with that of those who believe in a universal application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon as well as of non-nuclear-weapon Powers.

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

43. Our belief in this non-discriminatory application of safeguards is based on our view that this treaty is a step towards nuclear disarmament, which in the final analysis we all desire. From that point of view, we feel that the manner in which this article is drafted fails to foresee that final objective, however distant and idealistic it may appear now. In addition, we should welcome further explanations and clarifications with respect to this article from the co-Chairmen. In particular, we wonder how the time taken to negotiate individual agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency on safeguards, as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the same article, and the time of coming into force of this treaty will be reconciled.

44. An equally strong but silent force that is menacing world peace and security is the economic and technological backwardness of more than two-thirds of the world today. Much must be done, and in the shortest possible time, to bring about a change and betterment of the economic and technological standards of the developing nations. So far no known conventional means gives sufficient promise for a leap forward in this field. It is only natural, therefore, that as we are endeavouring to stop the spread of nuclear weapons we should at the same time be insisting on a clear and definitive commitment for better and intensified co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy, lest we forget and unwittingly shelve this noble function of nuclear technology with that of the weapon itself.

45. That is why we welcome the new version of article IV, which meets some of our concerns in its revised form. Equally welcome is the addition of a new article V, which bears a promise of sharing the "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions ... on a non-discriminatory basis", as well as a promise of access to explosive devices for a price that is described as one that "will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development". One may, however, wonder to what extent that price could be made to depart from conformity with the well-known principle of the monopolistic price mechanism.

46. Much as that worries us, we are nevertheless encouraged by the continuous assurances maintained in this Committee by the nuclear-weapon Powers that they would do their utmost to see to it that all nations would have the possibility to draw on the benefits of the technology of peaceful nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the provisions of this treaty. The statement made recently by



(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

Mr. Fisher at our 359th meeting on the preliminary stage of the peaceful application of nuclear explosives to extract natural gas from under the ground, together with document ENDC/213 presented by the United States on "Project Gasbuggy", is in that respect an encouraging sign of fruitful co-operation in the important field of peaceful explosive technology.

47. My delegation was very much impressed by the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley, when he said:

"If it is fair to describe the danger of proliferation as an obstacle to disarmament, it is equally fair to say that without some progress in disarmament the non-proliferation treaty will not last. Around this table there have sometimes been lone voices representing particular interests or points of view. On this issue -- the need for the nuclear Powers to follow up this treaty with some further measures of disarmament the Committee has been unanimous." (ENDC/PV.358, para. 23)

We have already had occasion at other times to state our convinced view that whatever we do now in drafting a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons its end result will be judged by what it can do to contribute to and facilitate further measures of disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons continue to be produced and as long as we shy away from a continued and realistic approach towards nuclear disarmament negotiations, the result of the non-proliferation treaty we aim to sign will be of minimal significance.

48. It is fitting that the new draft should include article VI, which aims to link the subject matter of the treaty with that of future disarmament. At our last session an important and carefully-worded draft article was submitted by the Mexican delegation for the consideration of the co-Chairmen. The article reads as follows:

"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith, with all speed and perseverance, to arrive at further agreements regarding the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, as well as to reach agreement on a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control." (ENDC/196, p.2)

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

The Ethiopian delegation then had pleasure in supporting the same draft article to be incorporated as a separate article in the body of the treaty. We felt then, as we do now, that this article would have ensured a definite commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to continue negotiations in the future on further measures of nuclear disarmament. The broad and generalized version of article VI as it appears in the new draft fails to ensure such a definitive commitment.

49. As it stands now, article VI appears to be much more generalized and less definitive than what has already been accepted in the preambular paragraph. In this respect we welcome the United Kingdom amendment contained in document ENDC/203, to the effect that the reviewing conference should consider the preamble together with the purposes and provisions of the treaty. Furthermore, we recommended that the co-Chairmen reconsider the drafting of article VI in the light of previous as well as new amendments and views.

50. One of the least controversial provisions which now appears as a separate article, article VII, deals with the "right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories." The Committee is well aware of General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) (ENDC/162), containing the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa. I have nothing new to add at this point except to indicate that, whatever the result of our negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty, it will no doubt bear heavy weight in our endeavours to negotiate and realize a convention declaring the continent of Africa a denuclearized zone.

51. With regard to article VIII, the Ethiopian delegation wishes simply to support the Swedish amendment contained in document ENDC/215, calling for further review conferences at intervals of five years whenever the need for such is felt by the majority of the parties.

52. Earlier in our statement we pointed out that the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons in the case of the great majority of nations would not really arise in any foreseeable future. It is because of that conviction that I should now like to raise certain questions with regard to paragraph 3 of article IX of the draft treaty. That paragraph stipulates:

"This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatories to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification."

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

What we should like to know from the co-Chairmen is the significance of the number forty: whether we are to understand that that number includes non-nuclear nations which are at present considered to be potentially nuclear Powers or not. We fail to see the significance of any arbitrary number that might be adopted for the purpose of this treaty as long as it does not guarantee the securing of the signatures of those countries which are in a position potentially to proliferate nuclear weapons. We shall be very happy to hear the views and explanations of the co-Chairmen in that regard.

53. Finally, we cannot fail to note that the revised draft is again silent on the question of security guarantees, and this despite resolution 2153 (XXI) (ENDC/185), operative paragraph 3 of which calls upon all nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against States parties to a treaty on non-proliferation. It would have been more appropriate for the co-Chairmen to include in the revised draft an article along the lines of that resolution. We are not unmindful, however, of the continuing consultations and negotiations that we are promised between the co-Chairmen on this question. We shall eagerly await the result of those consultations.

54. In closing my statement I should like to express once more the gratification of the Ethiopian delegation at the presentation of the revised draft, which brings us an important step forward towards the realization of the non-proliferation treaty. The draft treaty before us has survived a number of difficult issues which have at times caused despair and doubt. Given the will and time, what remains to be done is, in the opinion of the Ethiopian delegation, not insurmountable.

55. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened with great interest to the statements of the representatives of Sweden, Brazil and Ethiopia and we shall study them with the attention they deserve. In our present statement we wish to deal with a somewhat different question.

56. In our statement of 1 February (ENDC/PV.361), when speaking about the urgent problems in the field of nuclear and general disarmament which have to be solved, we pointed out the need to prohibit flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond the national boundaries of States. Today we intend to deal with this question in greater detail, bearing in mind the aide-mémoire which was recently transmitted by the Soviet Government to the United States Government (ENDC/217).

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

57. As is well known, at the end of January 1968 a United States bomber carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed on the western coast of Greenland and as a result the bombs broke in pieces and radioactive substances leaked out of them. In the area of the crash, radioactivity has been detected. In the opinion of competent scientists in various countries, the degree of radioactivity is such that there is a serious danger of contamination of extensive areas of the globe. Above all, the fisheries areas of the Atlantic Ocean have been affected. It is obvious that radioactivity will spread to further areas and that more and more States will be exposed to danger. This may happen also because the Gulf Stream is in the radioactive zone. So far there are no indications that in the near future it will be possible to find the lost bombs and render them harmless.

58. The accident to the United States bomber is causing great anxiety. We all realize perfectly well what serious consequences the spread of radioactivity may entail. Particular anxiety, however, is caused by the fact that the accident to the United States bomber in the Greenland area is by no means the first of its kind. Two years ago a similar case occurred over the Spanish coast in the Palomares area, where another United States bomber, also carrying nuclear weapons, crashed. Crashes of United States bombers with nuclear weapons on board had also occurred before, with the result that a number of areas were exposed to radioactive contamination.

59. One may well ask, what guarantee is there that no nuclear explosions will occur in such crashes? The fact that, as the United States Department of Defense assures us, the nuclear bombs carried by United States bombers are equipped with safety devices, provides no guarantee at all. The Western press reported at the time that in the case of one of the United States bomber crashes in January 1961 four out of five trigger switches were brought into operation and that everything depended solely on the last switch, which had it been actuated, would have caused the hydrogen bomb to explode.

60. United States bombers, as is well known, carry out flights over many countries of the world. Who can guarantee that the next crash of a United States plane carrying nuclear bombs will not occur over some densely-populated area? Tens and hundreds of thousands of people could be victims of such a catastrophe. The explosion of a nuclear bomb would cause incalculable sufferings

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

and devastation. It could lead to even more dangerous consequences in view of the tense situation in which we live. As is pointed out in the aide-mémoire of the Soviet Government, it could entail a whole chain of irreversible events, hazardous for the whole of mankind. Thus, apart from the direct danger to the life and health of human beings, flights of aircraft with nuclear weapons over foreign territory have a very dangerous political aspect: namely, they aggravate international tension and create a threat to international peace and security. These flights are needed by those who are afraid of peace and are doing their utmost to exacerbate the international situation.

61. An attempt is being made to convince us that the accidents to United States aircraft armed with nuclear weapons are mere incidents. But that is precisely why the most urgent objective is not to permit a situation in which such incidents, fraught with such serious and dangerous consequences for all countries and peoples of the world, could occur. Moreover, we cannot overlook the fact that there have been too many such "incidents". I would say that these so-called "incidents" are unavoidable as long as United States aircraft with nuclear bombs on board carry out flights outside their national boundaries.

62. We consider that flights by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond the national boundaries of States should be prohibited. Such flights, which lead to the radioactive contamination of the seas and of the territories of other States, are extremely dangerous and fraught with far-reaching consequences; they are contrary to the universally-recognized rules of international law and testify to a gross violation by the United States Government of those obligations which it has assumed under various international treaties.

63. It suffices in this connexion to point out that the actions of the United States are contrary to the Moscow Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, one of the purposes of which is "to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances" (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

64. Since as a result of the accident to the United States bomber there has arisen a real danger of radioactive contamination of the open seas, there is

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

every reason for asserting that the United States has violated the 1958 convention on the High Seas which it has signed and ratified and which obliges every State to take steps --

"...for the prevention of pollution of the seas or air space above, resulting from any activities with radioactive materials or other harmful agents."

(United Nations Treaty Series, volume 450, p.96)

65. Lastly, the accident off the coast of Greenland has clearly demonstrated that the United States Government, by permitting United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons to fly beyond the boundaries of United States territory, is crudely infringing the territorial integrity of other States in disregard of their national sovereignty. In this connexion reference may be made to the statement of the Danish Government concerning the accident off the Greenland coast to the effect that "flights over Greenland by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons are a violation of existing agreements". We fully understand the protests which are being made by a number of countries against flights over their territory by United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons. We fully support their just demands that such flights should be stopped.

66. The Soviet Government has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Government of the United States to the inadmissibility of flights by aircraft armed with nuclear weapons beyond national boundaries. We have already pointed out the serious danger inherent in such flights. Two years ago, on 21 February 1966, in connexion with the accident to a United States bomber off the Spanish coast, the Soviet Government, in an aide-mémoire to the United States Government, raised the question of the immediate discontinuance of flights by aircraft with nuclear weapons on board beyond national boundaries (ENDC/169). It is to be regretted that the Government of the United States has not drawn the appropriate conclusions.

67. In the aide-mémoire from the Soviet Government to the United States Government in connexion with the incident in the Greenland area, attention has been drawn again --

"...to the dangerous and even aggressive nature of flights by United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons, especially in the neighbourhood of the boundaries of the Soviet Union... It is obvious that the responsibility for such a way of acting rests wholly and entirely on the Government of the United States".

Flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond national boundaries are incompatible and in direct conflict with the universally-accepted principles of international law. Among a whole series of urgent and important international problems, this question calls for a solution without delay.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

68. I request you, Mr. Chairman, to circulate the aide-mémoire from the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States in connexion with the incident in the Greenland area as a document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.<sup>1/</sup>

69. Mr. DePALMA (United States of America): At a time when we are confronted with a General Assembly deadline and an opportunity to complete a major arms control measure, I regret that an attempt has been made to divert the Committee's attention to an aircraft accident in Greenland. I fail to see what constructive purpose could be served by discussing the matter here. Nevertheless, since the matter has been raised, let me summarize for the Committee the information on this accident which has been made available by the United States Department of Defense.

70. The United States Air Force B-52 bomber which crashed on 21 January on the ice in North Star Bay some seven miles south-west of the runway at Thule defence area, Greenland, was attempting an emergency landing. When a fire broke out and became out of control in the navigator's compartment and smoke filled the aircraft, the pilot headed for Thule, Greenland, as the only inhabited area close enough to render assistance.

71. The aircraft carried four unarmed nuclear weapons. Fragments of all four weapons, identified by serial-numbered components, have been recovered. Localized minor alpha radiation has been detected, but the levels present are not considered hazardous. Search operations are continuing. Built-in safeguards, perfected through years of extensive safety testing, have allowed the United States to handle, store and transport nuclear weapons for more than two decades without a nuclear detonation. Thorough safety rules and practices have also been developed for dealing with any weapon accident which might result from the spilling of nuclear materials.

72. With respect to the accident of 21 January, let me stress that no nuclear explosion was involved, the controls designed to prevent such an explosion by accident having served as intended. Allegations that we have violated the purposes of the limited test ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), any norms of international law, or the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas are without foundation.

73. I must say, finally, that I do not consider it particularly edifying to see this Committee subjected to a form of gross exaggeration designed to inspire fear among those who do not have full access to the facts or the technical knowledge necessary to evaluate the fact.

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<sup>1/</sup> Circulated as document ENDC/217.

74. Mr. WINKLER (Czechoslovakia): Important statements on the draft non-proliferation treaty have been made today in the Committee. My delegation, of course, will carefully study all those statements, as it has studied the statements, observations and suggestions already made at previous meetings. If necessary, we may revert to those statements. Otherwise, as the Committee knows, the Czechoslovak delegation has already clearly stated its position on the draft non-proliferation treaty.

75. This time I have asked for the floor, not to speak on the question of non-proliferation, but in order to take the opportunity to comment on the serious matter raised by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and also referred to in the short statement just made by the representative of the United States. We are, as I am sure are all nations all over the world, seriously concerned over events which have now occurred for the second time in the short period of the past two years, the consequences of which affect the vital interests not only of all European nations but of the people of the whole world. Besides, they are events related to the work of our Committee, which is charged in general with questions of disarmament.

76. In spite of continuous protests made by many sides and urgent appeals calling for the cessation of the dangerous flights by United States aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard, the United States continues those flights. As Mr. Roshchin has said, recently another aircraft with hydrogen bombs aboard --- hydrogen bombs of enormous destructive capacity --- crashed near Greenland. That crash, as is well known, resulted in the release of fissionable material and in radioactive contamination at the site of the accident. In the opinion of competent scientists of various countries, the danger of radioactive contamination on the shores of Greenland is very serious. Vast fishing areas in the Atlantic Ocean will suffer from radioactive contamination for many months, if not for years. I think this incident is all the more serious inasmuch as the ocean currents will disperse the nuclear pollution into other seas also. This only testifies to the fact that we are confronted not only with a local event but with a problem of wide importance.

77. It is well known that United States aircraft carrying nuclear bombs fly not only over Europe but also over other parts of the world. That means that similar events may occur elsewhere at any time. As is well known, the United States



(Mr. Winkler, Czechoslovakia)

Strategic Air Force operates from numerous military bases located on the territories of a number of foreign States. The two crashes within the past two years occurred in the vicinity of such military bases.

78. In our opinion, this confirms once again the importance of the demands for the dismantling of foreign military bases, which have been raised for many years by the governments of various countries and which constitute an important item on the agenda of this Committee. There we have another link between those serious events and the work of our Committee, despite the statement made just now by Mr. DePalma.

79. However, the radioactive pollution of the environment where the aircraft loaded with hydrogen bombs crashed is not the only phenomenon accompanying such accidents. A much more serious situation would result from the explosion of nuclear devices. I think it is unnecessary for me to elaborate in detail on the consequences of such an event.

80. I listened with interest to the short statement made by the representative of the United States; and we still bear in mind the position taken two years ago in a similar case by the United States representative in the Committee (ENDC/PV.238, p.20; PV 241, p.41). I have to say that we cannot be satisfied with the statement made by Mr. DePalma. It does not and cannot put aside our apprehensions. Nor can our apprehensions be dispelled by the fact, stated by Mr. DePalma, that in this case the crash did not take place in a populated area. That may have been a fortunate chance on this occasion, but another time the consequences may be even worse. No assertions about the harmlessness of such dangerous events can refute the fact that once again radioactive pollution of sea waters has taken place. The extent of that contamination cannot at present be determined precisely.

81. I think that the only effective answer to the apprehensions of nations all over the world would be the immediate cessation by the United States of all further flights of its aircraft carrying nuclear weapons outside United States territory. The necessity for the cessation of those flights does not lie only in their dangerous consequences and their dangerous character. It is also shown in the fact that such activities are in sharp contradicition of the attainment of the goals aimed at in the deliberations of this Committee. Our foremost duty is to help to reduce and eliminate the danger of a nuclear war, to contribute to the relaxation of international tension, and to strengthen confidence among nations.

(Mr. Winkler, Czechoslovakia)

82. It is, I think, unnecessary for me to advance further arguments to show that the continuation of such flights as those of which we are speaking is in no way consistent with the endeavours of this Committee. Therefore, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation I fully support the demand for an immediate cessation of flights of military aircraft carrying nuclear weapons outside national territories.

83. Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The statement of the representative of the Soviet Union which we have just heard has raised a most serious problem, which is causing the most justified concern everywhere. Once again, almost two years to the day after the accident at Palomares in Spain on 17 January 1966, a United States bomber crashed in Greenland with its terrifying nuclear cargo on 21 January. Thus, even before the fears and the emotion caused by the Palomares accident have been allayed, another accident of the same kind has confronted the world with a terrible reality.

84. The facts and circumstances of the two accidents are well known. In both cases, nuclear bombs fell to the ground. The only difference -- if there is one -- appears to be that, for the one bomb which fell into the sea off the Spanish coast, there are four bombs under the ice in Greenland, each with a power of more than one million tons of TNT.

85. As at Palomares, at least one bomb was damaged, so that it has already been possible to establish that there has been a leakage of radioactive particles and radioactive contamination of the waters. The same attempts as were made two years ago (ENDC/PV.238, p.20) are also being made now to present the matter as a trivial incident, to minimize the importance of what has happened and of the danger that has been escaped. Statements are being disseminated to the effect that the traces of radioactivity are insignificant, of negligible quantity; and it is to be expected that, as in the Palomares case, the safety device designed to prevent an explosion will be extolled and be said to have functioned as it should have done. I venture to stress the manner in which these accidents are being presented as a mischance which cannot be avoided.

86. The problem that arises is not whether this or that safety device functioned, because clearly it might equally well not function the next time. And everybody knows what that would mean. Nor is it important to show how effective are the measures to retrieve the bombs from the sea or to remove the contaminated soil from

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

Spanish beaches." The problem is to make such accidents impossible; and for that there is only one solution; namely, to put an end to the flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond the boundaries of the national territory of the United States.

87. Accidents such as that of Greenland are merely the consequence of these flights. This new accident shows once again how great and real is the threat levelled at the world by flights of United States bombers carrying nuclear bombs. It is a threat with manifold aspects, a permanent danger. These bombers, which are in the air twenty-four hours out of twenty-four, fly over populated areas. It is all very well to talk about the precautions taken; the fact remains that the circumstances of an accident can never be predicted.

88. The flights of United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons outside the boundaries of the national territory of the United States involve unimaginable risks of a conflict through what has been called "miscalculation" or "misinterpretation". These flights constitute one of the most dangerous elements of international tension, and accidents of any kind which they cause may at any moment bring about a very serious world crisis.

89. In an official statement published in today's newspapers the accident is described as "very regrettable", but obviously attributable to "world tension". This way of justifying the flights of United States bombers turns the facts upside down. Exactly the contrary is true: it is precisely actions of this kind that give rise to international tension.

90. For all these reasons the Bulgarian delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament associates itself with the delegations of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in condemning flights by United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons and in asking that an end be put to them, and also because we are profoundly convinced that these flights constitute a challenge to the efforts that are being made in this conference chamber.

91. Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): The Polish delegation would like to express its full agreement with the statement made today by the representative of the Soviet Union. We share his concern at the continuing flights of United States B-52 aircraft with atomic weapons on board. The latest accident over Greenland is, in our view, an eloquent reminder of the possible consequences of such flights.

92. It is sometimes argued that these exercises are needed in order to ensure the security of the United States. I do not intend to enter into a discussion of the relevance of these arguments, but I myself firmly believe that from the purely

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

military point of view such flights have no value whatsoever. I am also convinced that they are a relic of another epoch. These flights, while not contributing to the security of the United States, add to the tensions which affect dangerously the international situation. That is why they constitute a problem which we are entitled to consider, a problem concerning the international community as a whole.

93. We have the duty to draw attention to the fact that the continuance of flights of aircraft with atomic weapons aboard beyond their national borders can lead in the case of accident -- and experience has demonstrated that such accidents occur quite often -- to very grave consequences. They violate many existing international treaties. They can have far-reaching political consequences. They endanger life and may jeopardize world peace and security. Finally, I think I am in order if I also draw attention to the fact that any international incident involving atomic weapons might upset the delicate balance which we have reached in our Committee in negotiating the treaty on non-proliferation and affect adversely the outcome of our work.

94. Therefore the Polish delegation would like to join all those who have requested the immediate discontinuance of all flights of United States aircraft with atomic weapons aboard beyond the national borders of the United States.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 364th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador M.A. Husain, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Brazil, Ethiopia, the USSR, the United States, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland.

"The delegation of Sweden tabled a working paper with further suggestions in regard to the draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/216).

"The delegation of Brazil tabled amendments to the draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/201/Rev.2).

"The delegation of the USSR tabled an aide-mémoire of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States of America in connexion with the United States aircraft accident in the region of Greenland (ENDC/217).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 15 February 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.